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No FREE LUNCH: How SETTLEMENT
CAN REDUCE THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S





The belief that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial is widespread,
but the arguments in favor of settlement typically overlook how settlement
affects one of the most important functions of the legal system: deterring
undesirable behavior that gives rise to lawsuits. This Essay argues that set-
tlement can impair the ability of the legal system to deter harmful behavior
without chilling desirable behavior. This effect is a fundamental property
of settlement in that there is no way to change other legal rules to eliminate
it. Because settlement also has important benefits such as the reducing le-
gal costs and reducing uncertainty, this Essay does not argue for any across
the board prohibition of settlement. Rather, it suggests that judges should
be more circumspect about encouraging settlements and that there may be
situations where some restrictions on settlement are warranted.
I. INTRODUCTION
HERE is widespread support for the idea that it is better for cases
to settle than to go to trial.
Most lawyers, judges, and law professors think it is good that so
few cases are tried .... The reasons most commonly given for dis-
couraging trials are that settlements conserve resources and enable
parties to resolve their differences amicably. Settlements are said to
reduce attorneys' fees and court costs, free space on crowded dock-
ets, speed relief to injured plaintiffs, and avoid the need for judges to
decide difficult legal questions.1
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While these benefits of settlement are undoubtedly valid, these state-
ments look only at one side of the cost-benefit equation. After all, we
could reduce attorneys' fees and court costs and limit court dockets even
more effectively by simply prohibiting suit. We could get relief to injured
plaintiffs even faster by simply relying on first party insurance.2 Doing
so, however, would eliminate the unique benefit of the legal system: its
ability to influence the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits. Thus, to make
an appropriate judgment as to the wisdom of promoting settlement, one
must not simply look at how settlement reduces legal costs and delay, but
also examine how it affects the legal system's ability to regulate behavior.
This Essay does precisely that. In so doing, it demonstrates that in many,
though certainly not all situations, settlement can undermine the legal
system's effectiveness in inducing people and firms to behave in a way
that takes into account the effect of their actions on other people. That
is, settlement is not a "free lunch" but potentially comes at the significant
cost of undermining the incentives that we rely on the legal system to
create.
Ideally, the legal system will discourage actions that cause more harm
to others than the benefit they provide, yet encourage, or at least not
discourage, those activities whose benefits are greater than their harms.
To accomplish this task, the legal system attempts to ensure that parties
whose actions cause more harm than benefit will have to fully compen-
sate the harmed parties. 3 Knowing that he or she will have to compen-
sate all others for any aggregate harm caused by the action, a party only
will undertake the action if his or her benefit from the action outweighs
the harm to others. Likewise, parties whose actions do not cause any
harm ought not be required to compensate a victim for harm caused by
something else; otherwise parties will be discouraged or chilled from un-
dertaking actions that are on net socially desirable. When we consider
that the legal system typically does not require third parties who are
helped by an action to compensate the actor, we see another argument in
favor of ensuring that actors are not forced to compensate others for
harms for which they are not responsible.
For these reasons, an analysis which only compares the direct ex-post
consequences of settlement with the direct ex-post consequences of liti-
gated cases will be incomplete. One must ask how settlement affects the
incentives of the involved parties to engage in the behavior that may lead
to a lawsuit in the first place. While many issues relating to settlement
have received substantial attention, the vast majority of economic analy-
ses of settlement have focused on explaining why not all cases settle and
on how different legal rules affect the likelihood of settlement. 4 Receiv-
2. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
3. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Dis-
putes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1069 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Informa-
tion, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 404, 404 (1984); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 1075;
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61 (1971);
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ing much less attention is the more basic question of whether or not set-
tlement is necessarily desirable. 5 Some scholars have argued that there
may be too little settlement because parties do not care about the litiga-
tion costs they impose on other parties or the publicly funded courts by
refusing to settle.6 Others have noticed that under certain fixed legal
rules, allowing settlement can lead to less deterrence.7 As these authors
point out, however, in the settings they analyze, one can always change
the rules by increasing damages so that settlement does not produce less
deterrence than trial. 8 That is, they argue there are better ways to main-
tain deterrence than by discouraging settlement.9
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theo-
retical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55, 55 (1982); Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting
Rules, 25 RAND J. OF ECON. 197, 197 (1994).
5. Some legal scholars have criticized the judicial promotion of settlement. Owen M.
Fiss was one of the first. His main objections to settlement were that settlements could be
unfair due to an imbalance of power between the parties; that settlements may be made by
agents who do not necessarily have the best interests of the parties at heart; and that settle-
ments may create peace but do not necessarily create justice. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075.
Fiss's second criticism of settlement is quite valid, though we will not discuss it here since it
does not relate to the issues we discuss in this Essay. Fiss's first and the third criticisms,
however, do bear some relation to our argument. The problem with the "imbalance of
power" argument is that one's power in settlement negotiations relates directly to one's
power in litigation. If one party's lack of power leads them to accept an "unfair" settle-
ment (however one defines fairness), it must be because this party expects a worse out-
come should she have to litigate the case. See generally Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). That said, our argument against settlement
is based on an imbalance of information between the parties in that the defendant has
more information about the likely result of the suit than does the plaintiff. The problem
with this imbalance, however, is not that it leads the less informed plaintiff to do worse
than she would do if she were to litigate the case to judgment. If that were the case, the
plaintiff would simply refuse to settle. Instead, the problem is that settlements between
differentially informed parties often can make it more difficult for the threat of lawsuits to
deter harmful behavior without also deterring valuable behavior. While this is something
that potential plaintiffs should care about before they are injured, once they are injured
and are engaged in settlement negotiations, plaintiffs bargain to maximize their recovery,
not to improve the defendant's incentives to only take those actions that create more bene-
fit than harm. While in some sense this argument can be seen as one manifestation of
Fiss's claim that settlements create peace but not justice, Fiss did not explain his argument
this way. See also Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3-4 (1992); Coleman & Silver, supra note 1, at 102-03. None of
these articles argue that settlement can reduce effectiveness of the legal system's ability to
regulate behavior; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994); Leandra Lederman,
Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Set-
tlements, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 222 (1999).
6. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the So-
cial Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575 (1997); Steven Shavell,
The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and Settlement, 19 INT'L R.
L. & ECON. 99, 99 (1999).
7. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of
Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L R. L. & ECON. 109 (1988); Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 613, 614 (1997).




In contrast, we argue that settlement can fundamentally reduce the
ability of the legal system to deter harmful behavior without chilling de-
sirable behavior. Even when the rules for awarding damages can be
changed, when settlement is allowed there may be no way to alter the
rules to maintain deterrence without creating undesirable chilling. This
suggests that legal and economic scholars should examine rules promot-
ing settlement much more critically than they currently do. In particular,
this Essay provides guidance in assessing when settlement is most likely
to have significant costs in terms of hampering the legal system's ability
to effectively regulate behavior. As will become clear, this cost is most
likely to be significant for settlements that occur prior to significant dis-
covery-exactly those settlements that save the most legal costs.
We first consider, in Section III.A, a scenario where the defendant has
superior information about the damages the plaintiff will receive at
trial. 10 When the defendant1 is deciding whether to take some action
that might result in her being sued, 12 her best estimate of what she might
have to pay the plaintiff is what she expects the settlement or trial out-
come to be. Because trials are structured to reveal all the relevant evi-
dence, the defendant likely will expect the trial outcome to reflect her
information about the magnitude of the harm she has caused. Therefore,
when she has engaged in more dangerous actions or believes that she is
responsible for the harm suffered by the plaintiff, she will expect to pay
more damages after the trial. On the other hand, a pre-trial settlement
will probably not reflect all of the information the defendant has. The
plaintiff cannot insist on a higher settlement when the defendant knows
damages are likely to be large if the plaintiff does not know this informa-
tion. As a result, when the defendant expects to settle if she is sued, she
may expect to pay the same amount regardless of the harm caused by her
actions. Thus, when the defendant engages in an action that is signifi-
cantly more harmful than the plaintiff expects, the defendant can expect
to settle the case for substantially less than the true level of harm caused.
This may lead her to engage in an activity that she knows will cause great
harm only because she has the opportunity to settle the case.
In the second scenario, the defendant has superior information about
her culpability for the plaintiff's harm, and, thus, the probability that she
will be found liable should the case proceed to trial. We show that in this
instance, allowing settlement tends to reduce the accuracy of the legal
system and leads to either less deterrence of harmful activity or more
chilling of beneficial activity that could be mistaken for harmful activity.
10. This situation will probably only occur in a minority of cases. There are still, how-
ever, many types of cases where the defendant may have superior information about the
magnitude of damages. See Section III.B., infra.
11. More precisely, here we are speaking of the party that would become the defen-
dant in a lawsuit, even though she is not a defendant at this stage.
12. More precisely, here we are speaking of the party that will become the defendant
should it take an action that results in a lawsuit. For simplicity, we will just refer to this
party as the defendant even though she is not a defendant at this stage.
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Settlement can reduce the accuracy of the legal system because culpable
defendants have a greater incentive to settle than do blameless ones.
Therefore, if settlement does not occur, the plaintiff will realize that he is
more likely to be facing a blameless defendant. We argue this tends to
cause the plaintiff to put less effort into trial preparation, which reduces
the accuracy of the trial process. The less accurate the trial process, the
less effective the legal system is at deterring harmful activity without chil-
ling beneficial activity. Section IV.A. provides a more detailed and rigor-
ous exposition of this argument.
Our argument that settlement tends to lead to less deterrence of harm-
ful activities or more chilling of desirable activities relies on the premise
that the defendant-the party whose behavior is the subject of the law-
suit-has better information about a critical aspect of the case than does
the plaintiff. We do not, therefore, suggest that all settlements create
these problems. For example, if neither party had any doubt regarding
any of the consequences of the defendant's actions, the argument would
not apply. Even when settlement does impair the legal system's ability to
appropriately influence behavior, it does reduce legal costs, and we do
not intend to argue that it will always be undesirable on balance and
should always be discouraged. Instead, the purpose of this Essay is to
identify this downside of settlement that previously has been ignored and
to suggest that there are cases where judges might want to consider re-
stricting settlement, or at least not explicitly promoting it. More gener-
ally, this Essay argues that our legal system should be aware of the costs
of the policy tilt towards settlement.
Section II describes how the legal system favors settlement over trial.
Section III presents the analysis of how settlement can undermine deter-
rence (relative to the situation where all cases go to trial) when the defen-
dant has superior information about the harm her action causes. Part
III.A. explains this theory. Part III.B. discusses the types of cases where
this theory is applicable. Section IV then analyzes how settlement can
lead to the chilling of desirable behavior (again, relative to the situation
where all cases go to trial) when the defendant has superior information
about whether or not her action is responsible for the plaintiff's harms.
Again, Part IV.A. explains this theory and Part IV.B. discusses the types
of cases where this theory is likely to be relevant. Section V discusses the
implications these theories have for legal policy and, rather than recom-
mending any hard and fast rule against settlements, suggests that in some
cases judges should have the discretion to not enforce settlement agree-
ments. Section VI concludes that while settlement may reduce legal costs
and the burden on the courts, it often comes at the price of reducing the
accuracy and effectiveness of the legal system, and that settlement should
not always be encouraged or even permitted.
2008] No Free Lunch 1359
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II. POLICY TILT TOWARD SETTLEMENT
While many judges have viewed promotion of settlement as an impor-
tant part of their judicial role for some time, 13 promotion of settlement
formally became part of legal policy with the amendment to Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983.14 Rule 16 suggests that
judges may take action to encourage the parties to settle and allows
judges to impose sanctions on parties who do not participate in pretrial
settlement conferences.15 Rule 68 also allows a judge to impose costs on
a plaintiff who refuses a settlement offer that turns out to be more
favorable to her than the outcome of a trial.' 6 The "plain purpose of
Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation. ' 17 Rule 26(f)
requires attorneys to discuss the possibility of settlement with their cli-
ents.' 8 Even the Federal Rules of Evidence promote settlement.1 9
Under Rule 408, settlement offers and discussions are not admissible at
trial to promote "the public policy favoring the compromise and settle-
ment of disputes."'20 Congress has also endorsed the promotion of settle-
ment. The Civil Justice Reform Act21 encourages judges to promote
settlements as a way to reduce the expense and delay in the federal court
system.22
While public policy favoring settlement has some dissenters,23 it "has
generally received enthusiastic support from the commentators and the
courts. '24 The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the idea that set-
tlement is preferable to trial. As far back as the nineteenth century, the
Court declared, "settlements of matters in litigation or in dispute without
recourse to litigation are generally favored .... -25 Since that time, the
Court has consistently emphasized the importance of the public policy
13. See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69
JUDICATURE 257, 257 (1986). Surveys of judges, even before the 1983 amendment to Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, revealed that over seventy-five percent of trialjudges described themselves as interventionist in their promotion of settlement. JOHN
PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES 177 (1980). This intervention was predomi-
nantly through subtle suggestion, though over ten percent of judges reported using direct
pressure to promote settlement. Id.
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 16(f)(1)(B).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
17. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
19. FED R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
20. Id.
21. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (2006). For a complete description of all the mechanisms avail-
able to promote settlement, see McG. Bundy, supra note 5, at 3-4.
23. See supra note 5.
24. Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
25. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898).
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rationale for settlements.26 There are, however, cases where a strong
public policy rationale against settlements exists.
III. SETTLEMENT AND DETERRENCE
A. THE THEORY
The next two Sections focus on a case where a potential defendant 27
has a choice to engage in some activity or action that may cause her to be
sued. We restrict attention to suits for damages. Furthermore, we will
assume that a defendant acts rationally in her own best interest and de-
cides to engage in activity if, and only if, her benefit from doing so ex-
ceeds her expectation of how much she is likely to pay in damages and
legal costs (we refer to this as her "expected liability"). This assumption
does not imply that the defendant only cares about money-her benefit
from the activity may be non-monetary. Similarly, this benefit could re-
flect any disutility the defendant feels from harming another person. Fur-
thermore, we are not assuming that the defendant can predict the
outcome of the trial or of settlement with certainty. What is required is
that the defendant forms some estimate of the average costs of her action
so that she can weigh expected costs against benefits. We speak in terms
of expected liability, which the reader should understand is only an aver-
age; the defendant usually will not know her exact liability.
To analyze the effect of settlement on deterrence, we start with a model
of settlement bargaining under asymmetric information that has become
the standard in the law and economics literature. 28 Given that litigation
is costly to both parties, if each party could perfectly predict the outcome
of a trial, then there is a range of settlements that both parties would
agree is preferable to going to trial. For example, if both parties know
that the defendant would be found liable for $100 in damages and both
would have to spend $20 litigating the case, any settlement where the
defendant pays the plaintiff between $80 and $120 will make both sides
better off than going to trial. In fact, even if the parties cannot predict
with certainty the outcome of the trial (which is certainly the case), the
preceding range remains valid so long as both parties have similar esti-
mates of the outcome of the trial. That is, if both parties think the defen-
dant would pay the plaintiff $100 at trial on average, then they would
both expect to be better off on average with any settlement between $80
and $120. Similarly, if the defendant and the plaintiff both think the de-
26. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 211 (1994); Evans v. Jeff D., 475
U.S. 717, 736-38 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); Williams v. First Nat'l
Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910). It should be noted, however, that some have argued that
three recent Supreme Court decisions have not emphasized the policy favoring settlement
as much as in the past. See Cordray, supra note 24, at 36.
27. We use male pronouns for the plaintiff and female pronouns for the defendant.
28. See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 404, for a mathematical model of settlement bar-
gaining when one party has superior information about the likely trial outcome. This Es-
say, like most, does not consider the defendant's decision about whether to do the act that
results in the lawsuit.
2008] 1361
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fendant would be liable for damages of $120, then they would both be
willing to settle for something between $100 and $140. The important
thing to notice is that if both parties share the same expectation of the
award, when the estimate of the likely damage award increases, the val-
ues at which settlement will occur increases as well. When the parties
share the same expectations and these expectations are correlated with
the actual harm, the defendant's action becomes more costly to her as the
harm her action causes becomes greater.29
If the plaintiff does not have the same information as the defendant,
however, this may not be the case. Consider, for example, an antitrust
case where the defendant, because of her superior knowledge of the in-
dustry, has a very good idea of how much her anti-competitive conduct
costs consumers. The plaintiff, on the other hand, may know that the
defendant behaved anti-competitively but may not have a very good idea
of what prices would have been absent the anti-competitive conduct. If
the case does not settle, however, the discovery and trial processes likely
will uncover a great deal of the information that the defendant has about
the consequences of her anti-competitive conduct. While both sides may
have similar expectations about the probability of liability, the defendant
probably has much more precise information about the magnitude of the
damages a court will award should the case proceed to trial.
For example, the plaintiff may think that damages could be anywhere
between $50 and $150, while the defendant may know exactly what her
damages would be. 30 Any given settlement offer will be more attractive
to the defendant when she expects the damages awarded at trial to be
higher. For example, if the plaintiff offered to settle for $100, the defen-
dant will prefer to accept rather than go to trial if she knows damages will
be $80 or more (since by going to trial she will have to also pay $20 in
legal costs). If she knows that damages will be less than $80, however,
she will be willing to reject the offer and go to trial.31 Of course, the
29. In order to design a damage rule that provides perfect incentives, even when both
the plaintiff and defendant are equally well-informed, one needs to know where in the
settlement range the defendant expects the settlement to be. But even if incentives are not
perfect, with equally well-informed parties, the greater the action's harm, the less the de-
fendant has an incentive to act, even if she expects to settle the case.
30. While this example assumes the defendant has perfect knowledge of damages,
what is critical simply is that the defendant has better knowledge about what damages will
be than does the plaintiff.
31. Of course, in real settlement negotiations, there is more than one opportunity to
settle. Even in these situations, defendants who know that damages will be large are more
likely to settle than those who know damages will be small. The plaintiff cannot just as-
sume that a defendant who resists settling for a given amount actually expects damages to
be lower if the case goes to trial. If he did make this assumption and offered to settle for
less, then even a defendant who expects large damages could resist and obtain a lower
settlement offer. That is, if a defendant who expects damages to be small is not more likely
to have to go to trial than a defendant who expects damages to be large, there is no reason
for every defendant not to pretend in settlement negotiations that she expects damages to
be small. If the plaintiff always believes her, he will end up settling for a small amount
even when damages would have been quite high. Because this is not in the plaintiff's inter-
est, he will not accept a lower settlement offer just because the defendant has rejected a
larger one. As a result, defendants who expect damages to be large have a much greater
1362 [Vol. 61
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plaintiff might wish to offer to settle for a higher or lower amount. But
regardless of the plaintiff's offer, the same reasoning implies that the de-
fendant will only accept the offer if she believes the sum of the damage
award and her legal costs are likely to exceed the cost of accepting the
offer. Everything else being equal, a defendant who knows her action
caused a large amount of harm will settle; if she knows her action caused
only a small amount of harm, she will go to trial.
If the defendant knows the plaintiff's settlement offer will not depend
on the harm she actually caused, the defendant's expected liability for her
action is capped at the magnitude of the settlement offer she expects the
plaintiff will make.32 In our example, if the defendant expects the plain-
tiff will offer to settle for $100, she knows that she will never have to pay
more than this, and will always do the action in question whenever her
benefit from that activity exceeds $100. This is true no matter how much
harm this action may cause the plaintiff. Because the defendant expects
to receive a settlement offer that is lower than the actual harm, she does
not have efficient incentive to avoid this activity.3 3 In our example, say
the defendant's benefit from the activity is $110. She will engage in the
activity even if the harm it causes to the plaintiff is $120 or even $150
because she knows she can settle the lawsuit for $100. Furthermore, she
has no incentive to take actions that would reduce the harm from $150 to
$100, even if those actions would cost her very little.
Of course, if her benefit is below the settlement offer she expects the
plaintiff to make, she will refrain from the activity she knows that actual
damages will be large enough that she would want to settle.3 4 In this
case, she will compare her benefit to the actual damages (plus her legal
costs) when deciding whether to engage in the activity or not. So, if her
benefit is $80, then she will engage in the activity if it causes harm of less
than $60 (because she will also have to pay $20 in legal costs). Therefore,
actual damages continue to affect deterrence when the defendant's bene-
fit from the activity is low (below the expected settlement offer) but not
when it is high (above the expected settlement offer).
This reduces the ability of the legal system to induce the defendant to
act efficiently. When the defendant must pay all the costs associated with
her action, she then will have the incentive to engage in the activity if,
incentive to accept any given settlement offer than those who expect damages to be small.
Of course, this assumes that the defendant cannot, or does not wish to, reveal all the infor-
mation she has about the likely damages during settlement negotiations. Certainly, before
discovery the plaintiff has no way of knowing whether the defendant is hiding some infor-
mation that might suggest damages are large. Moreover, the defendant may be hesitant to
reveal too much information that might help the plaintiff at trial.
32. Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement, 3 CoNTRIBU-
TIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 16 (2004) (Article 4).
33. Id. at 3, 10.
34. The plaintiff's settlement offer can still be optimal if the plaintiff does not know
the defendant's benefit. If the defendant's benefit could be larger than this settlement
offer, then there is nothing necessarily irrational about making a settlement offer that turns
out to be larger than the defendant's benefit in some cases.
2008] 1363
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and only if, her benefits exceed the total costs. 35 As demonstrated above,
when damages equal the harm from the activity, settlement will weaken
deterrence because settlement acts like a cap on damages. More funda-
mentally, notice that there is no way to adjust the damage rule to solve
this problem. 36 To increase the damages by some amount for every possi-
ble level of harm to correct this problem naturally would increase the
settlement amount that the plaintiff would demand or accept, because his
expected recovery at trial would increase. This, however, does not elimi-
nate the damage cap effect of settlement; it only changes the monetary
value of the cap. In our example, if damages were set to harm plus $30,
the plaintiff might offer to settle for $130 rather than $100. Notice that
while the settlement amount is now larger, the defendant will still accept
the settlement offer if she knows the harm she causes exceeds $80, just as
before. (If the harm is $80, damages will be $110 and legal costs $20,
making the total cost of trial $130). When the harm exceeds $80, the
defendant will still decide to do the activity if, and only if, her benefit
exceeds the settlement amount (now $130). Her decision will still be the
same whether the harm is $80 or $150. Increasing the damages the defen-
dant must pay at trial does not change that the defendant will not con-
sider the actual harm her action causes whenever that harm is large
enough to make accepting the settlement preferable to going to trial. In
addition, notice that by increasing damages, and thereby increasing the
effective damage cap, we may now also chill socially desirable behavior. 37
For example, if the defendant's benefit from doing an activity is $125, she
may forego the activity that causes a harm of $80 because she expects to
settle the case for $130.38
Of course, settlement does have a major offsetting advantage: it
reduces legal costs. 3 9 In many situations, where legal costs are substan-
tial, these savings will outweigh the less efficient incentives that settle-
ment necessarily creates. 40 In our example, one situation where this
would be true is where the defendant's benefit is greater than $150. In
this case, it is always efficient for the defendant the act when she can
settle, so there is no reason to deter it. Likewise if the damage was al-
ways between $100 and $110, allowing settlement would also likely be
efficient. Nonetheless, it is easy to overstate the costs saved by settle-
ments. If allowing settlement leads to weaker deterrence, it also leads to
more activity that results in lawsuits. By improving deterrence, limita-
tions on settlement can reduce the number of cases filed. Because this
reduces the increase in legal costs that settlement limitations create, there
35. See Wickelgren, supra note 32, at 3.
36. See id. for a formal proof of these results.
37. See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, Settlement, and the Accu-
racy of the Legal System, 26 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2010).
38. This is inefficient because the activity causes a harm of $80 and in legal costs of $40
for both sides, for a total cost of $120, less than the $125 benefit.
39. Wickelgren, supra note 32, at 1.
40. Id. at 4.
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is much more scope for the benefits from improved incentives to out-
weigh the increased legal costs. 41 Coming back to our example, this will
happen when the defendant's benefit from the act is just barely greater
than the settlement amount (say it is $101 in the case where the plaintiff
makes an offer of $100 because damages equal harm). Now, if settlement
is prohibited, the defendant will only do the act if it causes a harm of less
than $81 (so her damages plus legal costs will be less than $101), so the
only cases that would have settled that now go to trial are those where
the harm is between $80 and $81. All the other cases that would have
settled when the harm exceeds $81, do not exist because the threat of
liability now deters the defendant from engaging in the activity.
Of course, prohibiting settlement, even in this case, is not always desir-
able. If the defendant's action causes a harm of less than $101, we do not
want to deter it since the benefit exceeds the harm as long as there are no
legal costs (because the case settles). On the other hand, prohibiting set-
tlement to deter this activity is desirable if the activity causes a harm that
exceeds $101. Unfortunately, more generally it is also true that whether
settlement is desirable depends on both the benefits and the harms of the
activity, making it difficult to write a general rule that always allows set-
tlement when, and only when, its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.
B. DOMAIN OF APPLICATION
This theory does not justify a blanket prohibition on settlement. In
many cases, the central premise of the theory probably will not hold. Re-
call that the main building block for the argument in the last section was
that the defendant knows more about the harm that her activity causes
than does the plaintiff. More precisely, the defendant must have some
information about the likely harm-not shared by or with the plaintiff-
both when she acts and when she is engaged in settlement negotiations.
In many cases, such as personal injury, this is unlikely to be true. A
physically injured plaintiff can more easily determine the extent of her
own injuries than can the defendant. Similarly, in many contract cases,
the non-breaching party will know what the harm from the breach was
more precisely, and the breaching party is unlikely to have any significant
private information.42
There are, however, many classes of cases where the premise of the
theory often will hold. In antitrust, as discussed in the preceding section,
the defendant's greater knowledge of the market will usually put her in a
much better position to compare the actual situation with the "but-for"
world where there was no anti-competitive activity.43 This problem also
can occur in some tort cases. Say a defendant emits a chemical that af-
41. There are cases where the incentive benefits of prohibiting settlement outweigh
the legal costs saved for any settlement offer that actually results in some cases settling.
See generally Wickelgren, supra note 32.
42. But see infra note 44.
43. Wickelgren, supra note 32, at 2.
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fects the yields of crops on nearby farms. Because crop yields are quite
variable, the plaintiff cannot simply compare his current yield to his nor-
mal yield to accurately determine how much the chemical affected it. In-
stead, the best evidence of the effect of the chemical on crop yields will
probably come from knowledge of the chemical itself. This is information
that the defendant-the producer of the chemical-is in a much better
position to know than the plaintiff, putting her in a much better position
to estimate compensatory damages.44
IV. SETTLEMENT AND THE CHILLING EFFECT
A. THE THEORY
The previous section showed how settlement can weaken deterrence
when the defendant has an informational advantage about the magnitude
of damages that a court will award. While such situations are important,
they are probably less prevalent than cases where the defendant knows
more than the plaintiff about the probability that the court will find her
liable. This section analyzes this scenario and shows that settlement can
reduce the legal system's ability to distinguish between legitimate and
harmful activities, thereby worsening the tradeoff between under-deter-
ring harmful activities and chilling legitimate ones.
One example concerns a factory that emits a chemical into the air or
water. Because the factory owner knows a great deal about her produc-
tion process, and may have superior access to scientists and engineers, she
probably knows much more about whether this chemical causes cancer or
other harms than do the people who live near the factory. If a person
who lives near the factory gets cancer, he will not know whether the
chemical emitted by the factory could have caused his cancer or not. If
he sues the factory owner, much of what the defendant knows may come
out at trial or during discovery, but at the time of the suit, the defendant
knows much more about the likelihood that she will be found liable than
does the plaintiff.
The argument that settlement can make it more difficult to deter harm-
ful behavior without chilling harmless behavior has two steps. First, the
44. A very similar effect can occur in contract cases. Consider contracts for the deliv-
ery of some input into a production process. If the defendant breaches by delivering a
different input than what the contract specifies, the plaintiff will probably know. However,
due to the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages, he will often have to use the input anyway
(if an alternate source is not available or is very costly). If many other factors, aside from
the quality of this input, affect the plaintiff's output (some of which could be very hard to
measure), his actual output may not provide very good evidence of how much the defective
input reduced his output over what it would have been with the correct input. Much better
evidence may come from information about the relative quality of the two inputs. The
defendant, because she produces these goods, will have much better information about this
issue than will the plaintiff. Similarly, if the contractually-specified input represented a
technological advance, then the plaintiff may not know what its production capabilities or
costs would have been had the contract been performed. The defendant, as producer, may
know much more about likely performance characteristics. This puts the defendant in a
much better position than the plaintiff to estimate damages.
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possibility of settlement causes the plaintiff to prepare less for trial (if
there is no settlement) than she would if settlement were prohibited.
Second, when the plaintiff prepares less for trial, the difference be-
tween the amount that a harmful producer expects to pay and the amount
a harmless producer expects to pay decreases. The possibility of settle-
ments that might occur after much of the trial preparation has been com-
pleted clearly decreases the plaintiff's incentive to prepare for trial. If the
plaintiff expects that there is a ninety percent chance the case will settle,
then there is a ninety percent change that any efforts in preparation will
be wasted.45 Less obviously, the possibility of early settlement can also
reduce the plaintiff's trial preparation effort, even in cases that do not
settle.46 To see this, we note that if the plaintiff makes a settlement offer,
the defendant has a much stronger incentive to accept the offer when she
has engaged in harmful behavior, and less incentive if her actions were
harmless. For example, a defendant who knows the chemical she emitted
causes cancer is more likely to be found liable at trial than is a defendant
who knows the chemical she emitted is harmless, making trial more costly
for the former defendant than for the latter.47 Thus, when a defendant
rejects the plaintiff's offer, the plaintiff rationally infers that it is more
likely that the defendant has evidence that the chemical is benign.
Consider the effect of this inference on the plaintiff's optimal litigation
strategy. If the chemical is benign, it will be less likely that the plaintiff is
able to find credible evidence that the chemical caused his cancer. The
more likely the plaintiff thinks it is that the chemical is harmless, the less
incentive he has to spend a lot of time and money searching for evidence
that it is dangerous. That is, the plaintiff's trial preparation effort is likely
to be more effective when the defendant really is responsible for the
plaintiff's injury than when she is not.48 Because of this, the plaintiff will
expend less effort when he thinks it is less likely that the defendant really
is culpable. 49 Because the defendant is less likely to be truly culpable if
she has rejected a settlement offer than if no settlement is made, this
establishes the first step of the argument: the possibility of settlement
45. Of course, this is less true for preparations which the defendant can observe, since
these preparations might affect the settlement the plaintiff can get. A great deal of trial
preparations, however, such as how much time is spent preparing witnesses, are not ob-
servable by the defendant, and will not affect the outcome if the case settles.
46. Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 37, at 2.
47. To illustrate this point, say the damages will be $1 million if the defendant is found
liable for the plaintiff's cancer. If the defendant knows her chemical emission did not
cause this cancer, the probability that the court will mistakenly find her liable may be quite
small, say five to ten percent. On the other hand, if the chemical is carcinogenic, the
probability that the court will correctly find the defendant liable may be quite high, say
seventy to eighty percent. Thus, a defendant whose chemical emission was dangerous will
accept a large settlement offer but if the defendant knows her chemical emission was be-
nign, she will certainly reject a large offer.
48. See Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 37, at 1-2.
49. Of course, there are many cases which are "slam-dunks" where the plaintiff does
not need to do much preparation at all in order to win. In these cases, however, the plain-




reduces the plaintiff's trial preparation effort. 50
The less a plaintiff prepares for trial, the smaller the difference be-
tween the expected liability from committing harmful acts and the ex-
pected liability of committing harmless acts will be. Notice that the
reason the plaintiff exerts less effort when he believes the defendant is
more likely to be blameless is because his effort is less effective when the
defendant is blameless than when she is responsible for the plaintiff's in-
jury.51 Because the effort is more effective against a culpable defendant,
any reduction in effort benefits the culpable defendant more than the
blameless one. 52
The plaintiff's reduced incentive to prepare affects the defendant's ex-
pected liability in all cases, whether they settle or not. When settlement
is allowed, both parties know that if a settlement offer is rejected, the
plaintiff will have less incentive to prepare and will not work as hard to
win the case.53 This reduces the chance that the defendant is found liable
if she rejects the settlement and goes to trial, and likewise reduces the
amount that a culpable defendant is willing to pay to settle the case.54
Since the plaintiff knows this, he tends to make a smaller settlement of-
fer. Thus, defendants who settle benefit from the fact that the plaintiff
would exert less effort if his settlement offer were rejected.
A culpable defendant benefits more than a blameless one when the
plaintiff does not prepare as much if there is certain to be a trial.55 This
decreases the difference between the culpable defendant's expected lia-
bility and that of the blameless defendant whenever settlement is possi-
ble. Furthermore, allowing settlement can directly decrease the
difference between the expected liability of culpable and blameless de-
fendants.56 Both types of defendants pay the same amount when they
accept a settlement offer, but since the culpable defendant would be
more likely to lose at trial, a culpable defendant that accepts an offer
saves more liability than a blameless defendant who accepts the same
offer. In other words, to the extent that defendants are able to capture
some of the ex-post benefit of settlement, these are more likely to be
captured by culpable defendants who have more to gain by settlement.
50. The possibility of settlement likely will not affect the defendant's trial preparation
effort since the defendant knows if she is culpable or blameless whether the plaintiff makes
a settlement offer or not.
51. Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 37, at 4.
52. For example, spending an additional 100 hours on the case might increase the
plaintiff's chance of winning by five percent if the defendant is blameless, but it might
increase it by ten percent if she is culpable. If the fact that the defendant rejected a settle-
ment offer causes the plaintiff not to spend this extra one-hundred hours preparing, then
the blameless defendant only has a five percent less chance of being found liable while the
culpable defendant has a ten percent less chance. The culpable defendant benefits more
from this reduction in effort.
53. Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 37, at 1.





For any given damage rule, the impact of settlement is to reduce the
expected liability of all defendants, either directly for those who do settle
or indirectly through the plaintiff's reduced incentive to engage in prepa-
ration effort should there be a trial. If the damage rule is flexible, it
would be possible to adjust it in the unrestricted regime, for example, by
using a damage multiplier or punitive damages, so that culpable defend-
ants face the same expected liability in either regime. Since settlement
tends to reduce the plaintiff's incentive to invest in preparation, however,
the unrestricted settlement regime will have higher damages and lower
preparation effort than the restricted settlement regime.5 7 If each combi-
nation produces the same expected liability for culpable defendants, the
expected liability faced by blameless defendants in the unrestricted settle-
ment regime will necessarily be greater. This follows because the lower
level of plaintiff preparation effort when settlement is allowed does not
benefit the blameless defendant as much as it benefits the culpable one.
Since unrestricted settlement reduces the difference in the expected lia-
bility faced by culpable and blameless defendants, if the liability for cul-
pable defendants is held constant, unrestricted settlement must increase
the expected liability faced by blameless defendants. That is, when the
defendant has better information about her likelihood of being found lia-
ble than does the plaintiff, settlement worsens the tradeoff between
under-deterring dangerous activities and chilling legitimate activities. 58
For example, since a rational, profit-maximizing factory owner will de-
cide whether to emit chemicals by comparing her benefits from doing so
(how much it reduces her production costs or increases her output) with
the expected liability that results, decreasing the difference in expected
liability either makes emitting a carcinogenic chemical more attractive or
makes emitting a benign chemical less attractive. Thus, allowing settle-
ment tends to make it more difficult to deter harmful behavior without
also chilling harmless behavior.5 9 For example, if the benefit from emit-
ting a carcinogenic chemical is $100,000 more than the benefit of emitting
a benign chemical, then it is impossible to deter a defendant from emit-
ting the carcinogenic chemical without chilling the benign activity unless
the difference in expected liability is at least $100,000.
As in the scenario considered in the previous section, one should bal-
ance this cost of settlement against the benefit it provides in terms of
reducing litigation costs. For many cases, especially those where the de-
fendant's informational advantage is not great, the chilling costs of settle-
ment may not be large. That said, we show in a more technical paper on
this issue that when the range of possible benefits the defendant can get
from her activity is quite small, the chilling effect from settlement will
often outweigh the benefit that settlement provides by reducing legal
57. See id. at 2.




costs. 60 To avoid completely chilling the harmless activity, the optimal
damage rule when settlement is unrestricted leads to much more harmful
activity. As a result, the savings in litigation costs from cases that settle is
almost completely cancelled out by an increase in costs from cases that
would not exist had settlement been restricted. In general, however, the
trade-off between the chilling cost of settlement and the litigation cost-
saving benefit is quite complicated and probably varies a great deal by
case. We discuss this issue further in Section V.
B. DOMAIN OF APPLICATION
Naturally, the effect discussed above will be more relevant to the desir-
ability of settlement in some cases and less relevant in others. In some
cases there may be no important benign activities that are in danger of
being mistaken for harmful activity. In these cases it would be possible to
encourage settlement to reduce legal costs while increasing penalties to
maintain deterrence with no unwanted consequences. Likewise, if the
trial process is costly, but perfectly accurate, there may be no decrease in
accuracy and no increase in chilling associated with allowing or encourag-
ing settlement. On the other hand, if the trial process is completely inef-
fective and is random in distinguishing between the activities, allowing
settlement does not decrease accuracy or lead to more chilling. We will
only care about this effect if it is important both to deter harmful activi-
ties and not to chill harmless ones. If the "harmful" activity is either not
very harmful or produces benefits that are almost as great as the harm
that it causes, then society may not lose much from the decrease in deter-
rence that comes from allowing settlement and holding punishment con-
stant. In this case, however, it might be better still to immunize the
activity from liability so as to save trial costs and not risk chilling legiti-
mate activities that might be mistaken for the harmful activity. Alterna-
tively, if the net benefits from the harmless activity that could be
mistaken for the harmful activity are very small, then it is probably not
worth the extra legal costs of restricting settlement to avoid chilling this
activity. However, when minimizing the risk of both types of legal errors
(not deterring the dangerous activity and chilling the beneficial activity)
is important one might want to restrict settlement in order to improve the
legal system's ability to distinguish between the two types of activities.
One category of cases where it is very important to distinguish between
culpable and blameless defendants is medical malpractice. Clearly it is
important to deter medical malpractice, yet it is vitally important that in
60. See generally id. The exact condition necessary for the proof is that effort by the
plaintiff increases the likelihood in both absolute and relative terms that he prevails against
a culpable defendant compared to the likelihood he prevails against a blameless defendant.
For example, suppose a low-effort plaintiff has a forty percent chance of prevailing against
a guilty defendant and a thirty percent chance of prevailing against a blameless defendant.
If a high-effort plaintiff has an eighty percent chance of prevailing against a culpable defen-
dant, our results will definitely hold if the high-effort plaintiff has less than a sixty percent
chance of prevailing against a blameless defendant. Id. at 2.
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doing so, society avoids or minimizes chilling the non-negligent provision
of medical services. Both the costs of medical malpractice and the costs
of chilling legitimate medicine are substantial. In the year 2000, a widely
noted study published by the Institute of Medicine estimated that medical
errors caused 98,000 deaths per year in the United States.61 On the other
hand, a recent study by the American Medical Association (AMA) finds
that more than eighteen states are in "full blown medical malpractice in-
surance crises."'62 Some of the examples the study cites are:
a More than 50 percent of Arkansas physicians reported in a recent
survey that they have been forced to reduce or discontinue one or
more medical services in the last two years due to rapidly increasing
medical liability premiums. 63
* Because of a legal climate making $1 million-plus jury verdicts
and settlements more common, an increasing number of Connecticut
obstetricians are no longer delivering babies, and premiums for
neurosurgeons and other high-risk specialists are more than
$100,000 .. .. 64
• Women with gynecological cancers in three rural Missouri towns
now have to drive more than 100 miles because the only local gyne-
cological oncologist was forced to eliminate his rural outreach clinic
due to increasing insurance premiums.65
The AMA's view is that liability should almost never force doctors to
stop performing high-risk procedures or to stop practicing altogether.66
While a less self-interested observer of these facts would conclude that
stopping some doctors from performing some procedures is probably de-
sirable, most probably would agree that it is unlikely that fifty percent of
all doctors in Arkansas are too dangerous or unqualified to practice
medicine safely. Thus, both patients and doctors are harmed by the chil-
ling of legitimate medicine. 67 On the other hand, the substantial costs of
medical errors suggests that substantially reducing the deterrent effect of
malpractice liability could also have disastrous effects. 68 The substantial
costs of both chilling and under-deterrence in the malpractice system sug-
gests that it is very important that our legal system distinguish legitimate
61. To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 25 (Linda T. Kohn et al.
eds., 2000). For a discussion of the lack of substantial progress in reducing the death rate
since the report was published, see Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years
After To Err Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 J. OF AM. MED. Ass'N 2384 (2005).
62. Am. Med. Ass'n, New AMA Analysis Shows 18 States Now in Full-Blown Medical







68. See generally Patrick A. Salvi, Why Medical Malpractice Caps Are Wrong, 26 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 553 (2006).
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medicine from malpractice. 69 It is plausible that restrictions on medical
malpractice settlements might be justified.
Chilling is also a major concern in the enforcement of antitrust laws,
especially restrictions on predatory pricing or illegal vertical combina-
tions. When predatory pricing effectively blocks entry into a market, the
losses to consumers can be substantial. 70 On the other hand, threat of
predatory pricing litigation can chill legitimate price competition and in-
crease the prices paid by consumers.71 The Supreme Court of the United
States has directly noted the danger that predatory pricing litigation may
chill legitimate price competition. 72
Similarly, while vertical mergers can sometimes cause significant anti-
competitive harm, they are not per se illegal and sometimes can bring
benefits to consumers. 73 Just as it can be difficult to distinguish between
pro-competitive price decreases and attempts to use predatory pricing to
monopolize a market, it likewise can be quite difficult to distinguish be-
tween a merger that is intended to take advantage of legitimate efficien-
cies and a merger that is designed to inhibit competition.74 Our theory
shows that allowing settlements may make it more difficult to deter illegal
activities without excessively chilling efficient legal behavior, and al-
lowing settlement may be undesirable in the antitrust context.
Patent litigation is another example where one can imagine that it may
be difficult to distinguish between legitimate innovation and patent in-
fringement. When the legal system gets the wrong answer in either direc-
tion, incentives to innovate are significantly diminished. In addition,
finding a patent infringement when there is none tends to chill legitimate
competition and increase prices for consumers. Because of the impor-
tance of innovation, restricting settlement to enhance the accuracy of the
legal system in this area may justify the resulting added litigation costs. 75
On the other hand, there are also cases where this theory of how settle-
ments can be harmful has little relevance. For example, there is very little
legitimate activity that is likely to be mistaken for armed robbery, so this
theory does not justify restrictions on plea bargaining in armed robbery
or other street crimes. Another set of examples would be any case where
69. See, e.g., John W. Hill et al., Law, Information Technology, and Medical Errors:
Toward a National Healthcare Information Network Approach to Improving Patient Care
and Reducing Malpractice Costs, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 159, 161 (2007).
70. See Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L.J. 2039, 2268 (2000).
71. See id. for a discussion of the issues surrounding predatory pricing.
72. Matsushita Elec. Indus Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)
("[M]istaken inferences ... are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect.").
73. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1961).
74. 54 AM. JR. 2D, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 7
(1996).
75. There are potential antitrust reasons for opposing some patent settlements as well,
particularly in the pharmaceutical area. See Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical




the contentious issue is the identity of the party that committed the harm-
ful act rather than whether the act itself was harmful. Where there is no
possibility that the act was harmless, chilling is not a concern. However,
even where the reduction in accuracy from allowing settlement does not
negatively affect efficiency through its effects on incentives, the increased
penalties faced by the innocent might implicate broader justice concerns.
V. LEGAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The primary implication of the arguments put forward in this paper is
that there are circumstances where the standard presumption that settle-
ment should always be encouraged is not valid. We argue that allowing
or encouraging settlement can be socially harmful when it is important
that the courts distinguish between actions that are really harmful and
actions that may appear harmful but are actually benign.
We do not argue, however, that settlement should always be discour-
aged or prohibited. In all but the most extreme cases, allowing settle-
ment should lead to a decrease in legal costs. Depending on the
importance of deterring the harmful activity and the undesirability of
chilling the beneficial activity, the savings of legal costs can outweigh the
decrease in deterrence and the increase in chilling. There will be cases
where there may be very little decrease in accuracy from settlement, such
as if the defendant has little private information about the outcome of the
case, or if the courts either are very accurate or very inaccurate. Unfortu-
nately, although the theory describes the conditions that make settlement
more or less likely to be beneficial in the abstract, in practice it can be
difficult to determine in which specific cases settlement will be desirable.
Because of this, any reappraisal of our legal policy towards settlement
probably should not be enshrined in any hard and fast rules. Given how
much the facts of each individual case affect whether that case is one
where settlement should be restricted, the only feasible way to restrict
settlement without creating a rule that is both over- and under-inclusive is
to set up general guidelines and give individual judges a great deal of
discretion in regulating settlement agreements.
How might judges regulate or discourage settlement? The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure already give judges the ability to encourage set-
tlement via Rules 16 and 68.76 The argument in this paper suggests that,
at a minimum, judges should not use these tools in circumstances where
settlement might lead to substantially decreased accuracy or increased
chilling. Actively discouraging settlement presents a more difficult issue.
Although the courts have the power to block a settlement which occurs
after the case has already been filed,77 it would be very difficult for the
court to block settlements that occur before a claim is filed. One solution
would be to limit the enforceability of any waiver of rights to litigate in
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 68(a).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
2008] 1373
SMU LAW REVIEW
connection with the case if a court found that settlements were undesir-
able and against public policy. The grounds for it being against public
policy would be exactly the arguments presented in Sections III and IV.
To determine whether to set aside a settlement agreement, a judge would
use the theory explicated in this paper to weigh the incentive benefits of
restricting settlements against the added litigation costs that doing so
would create, keeping in mind that the final determination would depend
on the amount of private information held by the defendant and the im-
portance of avoiding chilling in the particular type of case. In so doing,
judges would need to keep in mind the classes of cases where chilling is a
particularly big concern, such as medical malpractice or antitrust.
It is worth pointing out that that under both theories, smaller settle-
ments (in terms of the proportion of the actual damages) are more prob-
lematic than larger ones. When a defendant's informational advantage
concerns the magnitude of the damages, the lower the settlement the
lower the cap on expected liability. This creates a wider range of possible
harm where a defendant's decision about whether to do the act is based
on a comparison of the benefit to the settlement amount rather than on a
comparison of the benefit to the actual harm she expects to cause. 78 Sim-
ilarly, if a defendant's informational advantage concerns liability, the
smaller the settlement offer the more likely that a defendant who rejects
such an offer is blameless. This means that the reduction in preparation
effort caused by settlement will be even larger, leading to an even greater
reduction in accuracy. Under either theory, evidence that the settlement
amount was quite large given the type of case should tend to make a
judge lean against setting aside the settlement agreement.
Giving a judge discretion not to enforce the promise to terminate litiga-
tion in a settlement agreement would greatly limit the attractiveness of
small settlements in cases where the parties believed the asymmetry of
information was such that the settlement agreement might not be en-
forced. Specifically, a defendant would be reluctant to agree to pay a
small settlement amount to the plaintiff, since after payment, the plaintiff
might be able to continue the litigation if the judge rules that the plain-
tiff's promise to terminate litigation is unenforceable. Notice that the
mechanism we propose is asymmetric; the judge may set aside a promise
not to litigate, but not the payment for that promise. 79 This is important
to give the plaintiff an incentive to make a claim that the settlement is
against public policy. If the judge simply sets aside the entire agreement,
neither side will normally have an incentive to make such a claim, since
the parties would not reach a settlement unless they thought it was better
for both of them than going to trial.
78. Wickelgren, supra note 32, at 3.
79. In theory, the mechanism could be reversed: a judge could set aside the payment
but enforce the promise not to litigate if the defendant brought the undesirable settlement
to the judge's attention.
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One key problem with this approach is that not only may judges not be
able to perfectly determine which settlements undermine deterrence or
risk chilling sufficiently to warrant setting them aside, but the parties
themselves often may not be able to accurately predict if their settlement
is likely to be enforced or not. This uncertainty could prevent settlements
that neither have substantial adverse effects on deterrence nor contribute
to the chilling of legitimate activities. However, the courts could develop
a balancing test that takes into account the factors we discuss in this pa-
per in determining when to overturn settlement agreements. Likewise,
the courts could develop safe harbors, such as always enforcing settle-
ment agreements in certain kinds of cases where chilling is thought not to
be important, or always enforcing settlements that are for at least a cer-
tain percentage of the claim. Finally, the courts could set a high standard
of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, that a settlement is
against public policy. While a high standard of proof limits the effective-
ness of this system at preventing harmful settlements, it surely would be
more effective at preventing these settlements than the current system,
and it would create only a minimal risk of undermining desirable settle-
ments.8 0 This approach would at least represent an incremental improve-
ment to the problem of excessive settlement.
Another approach to discouraging settlements-and the first one that
would occur to most economists-would be to tax them. While taxes are
often more efficient than direct regulation,8 1 taxing settlements is proba-
bly not the best way to discourage them. The main problem is that taxes
are not very flexible. For example, while the theory shows that larger
settlements weaken deterrence or increase chilling less than smaller ones,
what constitutes a large or small settlement will vary widely across cases.
Giving judges the flexibility to set aside a settlement allows them to vary
this decision in accordance with the facts of the case much more than
would a standard tax.8 2
Since under both theories, a defendant must have an informational ad-
vantage over the plaintiff to make settlements harmful, judges should
view post-discovery settlements much more favorably than pre-discovery
settlements. One would expect that in most cases, discovery will greatly
reduce the defendant's informational advantage.8 3 If after discovery, the
plaintiff has almost as much information as the defendant about the mag-
80. This would also reduce the attractiveness to the plaintiff of attempting to continuelitigation after agreeing to a settlement, and it would greatly limit the legal costs that this
further hearing could create.
81. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective
Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2002) for a discussion of why, in
general, taxes are superior to direct regulation. Their argument does not apply in this casebecause unlike the case of a pollution tax, for example, the optimal tax here would depend
on the benefits as well as the costs of settlement. As a result, the information requirements
for a tax are no less severe than they are for direct regulation.
82. In principal, one could allow the judge to set the tax after examining the facts of
the case, but this is then not fundamentally different from setting aside the settlement and
having a trial that examines the facts of the case and assesses damages.
83. Wickelgren, supra note 32, at 2-3.
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nitude of the damages or the likelihood of liability, then settlement after
discovery will not have the same negative effects on incentives as settle-
ment before discovery. Because the plaintiff can adjust his settlement
offer based on what he has learned about the amount of damages or like-
lihood of liability, he will demand a greater settlement from a culpable
defendant and will accept a smaller settlement from a blameless
defendant.
When the settlement varies with the blameworthiness of a defendant's
action, sufficiently allowing settlement does not necessarily entail a dilu-
tion of deterrence or an increase in chilling. Even if the plaintiff has
some uncertainty about the culpability or damages caused by the defen-
dant, if the defendant does not have any remaining private information,
the plaintiff cannot learn anything by the fact that the defendant has re-
jected or accepted the offer. Allowing settlement after the defendant has
shared all private information will not decrease the effort of the plaintiff
at trial. In practice, one might think that the defendant may have success-
fully hidden some incriminating evidence from discovery, yet may still
have some fear that it would come out in trial. Nevertheless, one would
expect the magnitude and importance of private information post-discov-
ery to be much less than it is pre-discovery. Therefore, restrictions on
pre-discovery settlements may often be sufficient (or close to sufficient)
to solve the incentive problem described above. This further limits the
increased legal costs necessary to improve deterrence or prevent exces-
sive chilling of legitimate activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that settlement is not a "free lunch." While hav-
ing cases settle rather than go to trial may reduce legal costs and the
burden on the courts, it often comes with the cost of reducing the accu-
racy of the legal system and degrading the system's effectiveness at regu-
lating behavior. Although we acknowledge that settlement usually
involves a significant savings of resources, we argue that one must weigh
the cost savings against the negative effects on both the deterrence of
harmful activities and the chilling of beneficial ones. While these nega-
tive effects of settlement will not outweigh the benefits in every case, or
maybe even in most cases, they will be substantial in a significant number
of cases. In such instances, legal policy should not encourage settlement.
We believe there are cases where settlement should be discouraged. Un-
fortunately it is not easy to develop hard and fast rules determining ex-
actly when the negative incentive effects of settlement outweigh the cost
savings benefits. Nevertheless, this Essay points out some general circum-
stances that tend to increase or decrease the desirability of settlement.
We argue that judges should have discretion to discourage settlement
when they believe it is likely to be harmful, but should be constrained by
a combination of general guidelines, safe harbors, and a high standard of
proof.
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